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1. Introduction 
The basic question I wish to address is: how can modern economic theory help us 
understand the issue of fairness? In the course of the discussion, I hope to accomplish two 
things: first, to explain the process of the mathematical analysis of fairness - how this 
research is conducted and why - and, second, to evaluate the potential of this methodology 
for solving real allocative problems. 
I will begin by considering the separate roles played by theoretical and applied 
research. And in doing so, I will inc1ude various reflections on methodology, modelling 
strategies, objectives, etc. that I hope will provide sorne perspective on what may seem like 
an arcane exercise. 
But the focus of the paper will be on the second objective, on recent techniques that 
have been developed expressly for the purpose of providing practicable tools. Among the 
concepts to be discussed, the cornmon feature is that they do not require information other 
than that which is readi1y available or easy to obtain, and thus, in principIe, they are capable 
of being used in practice. In particular, they expressly avoid interpersonal comparisons of 
utility or psychological well-being. That is, they avoid such statements as: Person A should 
receive more than B because A likes it better. 1 
IOf course, 1 do not wish to suggest that interpersonal comparisons of all sorts are untenable, but only those 
of utility. Nor do 1 wish to suggest that we can or should avoid utility comparisons altogether. There are sorne 
circumstances under which such comparisons are feasible (for example, if A wants more and B does not), and there 
are other circumstances under which they are inevitable (in sharing dessert, spouses will continue to consider 
intensity of preference in spite of the fact that this might not stand the rigors of logic). But for the standard case 
in which neither A nor B is satisfied with their portion, the statement "A likes it better" is logically insupportable 
since there is no cornrnon measure of wants. 
Note, however, that the issue of interpersonal comparisons of well-being is by no means resolved. For 
recent discussions, see Elster and Roemer (1991) and D' Aspremont (1994). 
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1 refer to the concepts presented here as ordinal theories 01 distributive justice. And, 
while ultimately sorne interpersonal utility comparisons may prove necessary, the immediate 
question concems the extent to which allocative problems can be resolved fairly without 
relying on such comparisons, thereby removing one source of subjectivity. 
In spite of the fact that equity has been one of the great overarching themes in the 
formal discipline of Economics since its inception in the late 18th century, the ordinal 
approach has emerged only within the last 25 years. It is thus relatively new. But, as 1 hope 
to show, it is a promising development. And 1 anticipate that as we become more aware of 
the limits to growth as a panacea, our attention will tum more to the question of how to 
share our resources. 
The plan for the paper is the following. First, 1 will discuss methodological issues in 
the analysis of faimess. 1 will then describe various notions of faimess that have been 
proposed in the literature. But rather than include an exhaustive survey, 1 will simply 
provide examples of the main paradigms. 2 Each of these, 1 believe, represents a significant 
departure from conventional views both within the profession and outside. 1 will begin by 
describing notions of equitable outcomes or end-states. However, while economists have 
focussed primarily on this domain, the public has been largely concemed that the procedures 
used 10 allocate resources should be fair and that people should have equal opportunities. 
Subsequently, therefore, 1 will discuss sorne theoretical contributions on procedural faimess. 
Formal analysis of opportunity inequality has begun only recently, and 1 will describe 
preliminary work in this area as well. 
2See Arnsperger (1994), Thomson (1990b), and Thomson and Varian (1985) for complete surveys. 
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I will then consider several areas in which the aboye ideas might be fruitfully applied. 
These include the division problem with single-peaked preferences, cost sharing, common 
ownership, and privatization. I will conclude by highlighting sorne of the important issues 
that have arisen in the course of this research and by suggesting an agenda for the future. 
2. Theory and Application in the Study of Faimess 
I believe the ultimate goal of most practitioners in this area is to identify equitable 
solutions to real allocative problems. The purpose of theoretical research is to try to make 
this statement precise: what is an equitable solution? Thus, theory and application are related 
endeavors. However, neither can be seen as the sole legitimate research focus. There are 
several clear reasons for this. 
In one direction, we may come to realize through the theoretical analysis of faimess 
that an essential ingredient is immeasurable and thus impracticable. For example, it may be 
impossible to fully disentangle the social contribution to the development of talents (in the 
form of education, liberty to pursue one's interests, etc.) and yet this may be necessary in 
order to identify just rewards. In economic terms, we may wish to recoup the retums to 
public investment in training, allowing each individual to retain only that portion of their 
reward that accrues to their individual contribution, and yet we may only be able to observe 
an amalgam of effort, innate talent, and training. It is precisely by means of theoretical 
research that we come to identify such intricate webs. This legitimizes the pursuit of 
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understanding independent of applicability. 
Also, a particular application requires that we specify the details of the problem at 
hand. In contrast, theoretical analyses tend to focus on general principIes and thus may be 
applicable to entire classes of problems. Thus, an additional benefit of theoretical research is 
that it may facilitate applications. 
Finally, experimenting on a grand scale with various social institutions may be 
prohibitively costly, and theoretical research affords a way to compare alternative 
institutional structures without incurring such costs. 
In the other direction, there are many real allocative problems that must be resolved 
equitably and cannot wait for the development of a solid theoretical foundation. For 
example, as a humane society, we must maintain a social safety net in the form of welfare 
programs in spite of the fact that we do not yet fully understand all of the consequences of 
doing so (in terms of incentives, administrative costs, etc.) - perhaps we can identify the 
direction toward a just society even if we cannot see the final result. 
And so theoretical and applied research are both necessary; they play independent but 
complementary roles. The next question is how does one do theoretical research. The 
canonical procedure is the following. First, the physical and/or social environment usually 
provides the source for analytical problems.3 Theoretical work begins by trying to isolate 
the essential ingredients in determining actual phenomena. This is done by constructing a 
mathematical model and attempting to replicate the phenomena. Indeed, the first important 
test of a model is the "fit" between its observable implications and actual data. Then, given 
30f course, along the way, numerous questions arise concerning the analytical techniques themse1ves. And the 
deve10pment of analytical/mathematical to01s has generated entire fie1ds within Economics. 
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a sufficiently well-fitting model, the final stage of the analytical process is to investigate its 
unforeseen implications. In other words, assuming the model adequately describes the actual 
process that generated the data, what can we forecast or project beyond that which is known? 
This is typically the manner in which positive, or descriptive, economic theory is 
conducted. However, most theoretical research on faimess is not of a positive nature at aH, 
but is normative, or prescriptive. Here, the objective is not to infer the underlying economic 
structure from observed data, but rather to consider and contrast altemative solutions to 
economic problems. In terms of the aforementioned schema, the process is much the same, 
with one essential difference. Rather than evaluate the model by considering its fit with 
actual data, we now appeal to our own introspection or intuition for validation. For instance, 
there may be certain "test cases," particular examples in which we have very strong 
preconceptions of what is fair, and we can apply the model to these to ensure that it 
generates solutions consistent with our basic intuition. Having passed such tests, we can then 
apply the model to more difficult problems where our intuition is a less reliable guide and 
see what the model recornmends. 
Consider the following example. Suppose there are two smaH children and two toys, 
and, as is often the case, each child wants to play with both toys. This is an example of an 
exchange problem in which given quantities of two "cornmodities" are to be allocated 
between two individuals. In this case, however, it is not the toys per se that are to be 
allocated but the amount of time each child gets to play with them. And a solution is a 
sharing rule which specifies such an allocation. We then ask: what is a fair solution? If we 
assume that both children have equal claims to the toys, then clearly one equitable solution 
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would be to let each child play with each toy for half the time, that is, to divide the 
resources equally. 
One test case for any concept of fairness is that in which the individuals are identical 
in every respect. Intuition suggests that in such cases agents should be treated equally. And, 
indeed, "fairness as equal division" behaves accordingly. However, if the agents have 
different tastes, then it is no longer obvious that only equal division is fair. Returning to the 
example, even though both children want to play with both toys, that does not mean they 
have the same preferences nor that they like both toys equally. Suppose, for instance, that 
one child has a taste bias for the first toy and the other child has a taste bias for the second 
toy.4 Then both children could be better-off if the toys were shared unegually. Thus, equal 
division seems too restrictive a definition in even the simplest case involving heterogeneous 
agents. In the subsequent discussion, I will describe alternative notions of fairness that take 
taste differences into account. 
2.1. The Definitional vs. Axiomatic Approach 
The previous example demonstrates what I would call the definitional approach to 
fairness. Here, one directly proposes a definition of fairness (such as equal division) and 
proceeds to evaluate how well it works by applying it to various cases. But as we saw in the 
example, the same notion of fairness might work well for sorne problems (Le., provide 
reasonable answers) and not for others. This suggests that we should not only distinguish 
between different concepts of fairness, but also between different classes, or domains, of 
4Note that admitting taste differences and directly comparing utilities are quite distinct. It is possible to include 
the former in such a way as to avoid the latter. 
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problems. 
Formally, let g represent the set of all allocation problems. One can think of a 
notion of fairness as a rule F defined on a class or subset of problems go that associates with 
each problem in the class, one or more fair solutions. And one must define both an 
appropriate rule F and an appropriate domain go, and these are inextricably linked. 
Sorne examples of different classes of problems are the following: (1) 2-agent 
problems, such as in the previous example, versus n-agent problems, which involve any 
number of individuals,5 (2) exchange problems in which the aggregate quantities of 
resources are fixed versus production problems in which the aggregate quantities can vary; 
and (3) problems in which agents have the same tastes and/or talents versus those in which 
agents are heterogeneous. Ideally, the goal is to formulate a "good" F for as large a class 
go as possible. However, 1 believe it is now generally accepted that no single formulation is 
appropriate for all problems.6 
The definitional approach is complicated by the fact that distinguishing fair from 
unfair solutions is only the first and simplest step in a hierarchy of analytical objectives. The 
goal of most theoretical research on fairness has been to formulate an appealing and, as 
mentioned, practicable definition. But this does not tell us which of two unfair solutions is 
more fair. That would require an ordinal ranking of solutions. And in light of the fact that 
full equality may be unattainable, such comparisons are necessary. Finally, we might wish 
to know whether a social state is very inequitable or only slightly unfair. For this, we would 
SI discuss the value of concentrating on the 2-agent case below. 
6See Baumol (1986, p.5), Binmore (1994, p.11), Thomson and Varian (1985, p.125), and Young (1994, 
p.162), to name only a few. 
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need a cardinal measure which would assign a specific value to the degree of faimess of 
each social state. 
This hierarchy is not simply semantic. As Thomson and Varian (1985) discuss, at 
least a full ordinal ranking is required for second best analyses, or analyses of incremental 
improvements in faimess. 
An altemative methodology is the axiomatic approach. 7 Here, one begins not with a 
particular formulation of faimess, but rather with a list of general properties, or axioms, that 
an appropriate formulation should satisfy. One example of such a property is the equal 
treatment of equals described earlier. More generally, one might require that a suitable 
notion of faimess should differentiate between individuals on1y on an appropriate basis - it 
should not be capricious. One way to capture this intuition is to insist that, were the agents 
to trade places in all relevant aspects (and on1y those), then the solution should change 
accordingly: if you were awarded x and 1 was awarded y on the basis of certain 
characteristics, then if we were to trade characteristics, 1 should receive x and you y. This 
ensures that no other characteristics matter. This property, referred to as anonymity, 
logically implies the aforementioned equal treatment property. Another property is that of 
resource monotonicity, introduced in this context by Roemer (1986). To capture the intuition 
that people are jointly entitled to a pool of cornmon resources, resource monotonicity 
requires that if the aggregate quantity of resources were to increase, then all agents should 
end up better-off. Altematively, individual rationality from equal division means that if all 
7Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984) contains an excellent description of this method.
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agents have equal claims to given resources, then each should be at least as well-off as if he 
or she were to receive an equal share. A final example, intimated earlier, is that, in addition 
to allocating resources equitably, one might want to allocate them (Pareto) efficíently as well, 
that is, it should be impossible lO make someone better-off without making someone else 
worse-off. 
Given a list of such axioms, the central issue is whether there are elements that 
satisfy them. 8 If there are, the next step is to identify what they are - to characterize or 
completely describe the class. 9 (1 will provide examples of such axiomatic characterizations 
below.) If there are no such elements, then the axioms are logically inconsistent and we 
have identified a necessary tradeoff: one cannot achieve all of the properties and must 
therefore choose among them. For example, Moulin and Thomson (1988) have shown that 
resource monotonicity, individual rationality from equal division, and Pareto efficiency are 
logically incompatible. That is, there is no allocation procedure that satisfies all three 
properties at once. Such "negative" or "impossibility" results are instructive in that they help 
us identify logical inconsistencies in our moral intuition; if our goals are unrealistic, then we 
must refine our sensibilities and our expectations of faimess. 
2.2. Additional Remarks on Methodology 
1 will conclude my discussion on methodology with a few additional remarks. 
8A note on terminology. In the sequel, 1 will discuss various objects for a notion of fairness - outcomes, 
procedures, net trades, opportunities. For this reason, 1 use the generic term "element" to refer to any of the aboye. 
9Generally, the axiomatic approach is not useful for evaluating and contrasting alternative (feasible) policies. 
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2.2.1. Income inequality 
First, one might ask: why in market economies is it necessary to discuss faimess in 
terms other than the distribution of income or wealth? That is, since money is the means of 
acquisition, and since it is comparable across individuals, why should a "practical" theory of 
faimess consider anything else? Moreover, the focus on income inequality is particularly 
attractive since it reduces the relevant comparisons to a single dimension and there is a well- . 
developed body of theory on the subject. 
Unfortunately, however, a theory of faimess which concentrates solely on income 
differences is inadequate for several reasons. 1O First, income or money is a means to an 
end, namely, the acquisition of tradable commodities, and it is only appropriate within a 
market context. Thus, the analysis of income inequality does not help us understand the 
basic meaning of faimess, but only its manifestation in a market economy. In particular, it 
does not tell us why a state of the economy is fair. And it is precisely this "why" which 
enables us to apply similar reasoning in non-market settings. Thus, for example, income 
inequality analysis is irrelevant when considering the allocation of nontradable goods such as 
voting rights among an electorate or schooling among children or transplant organs among 
potential recipients. Yet these are real allocative problems that must be resolved even in 
market-oriented societies. 
From a broader perspective, if we begin within a particular institutional setting, such 
as that of a market economy, then we cannot compare altemative institutions. Which is 
more likely to achieve a fair outcome? And at what expense? 
lO! do not mean to imply that the analysis of income inequality is either unimportant or misdirected, but simply 
that it should be part of a more extensive research programo 
10 
Finally, income inequality comparisons may be unsuitable for problems involving a 
small number of individuals where the assumption of price-taking behavior is inappropriate. 
2.2.2. Micro versus macro justice 
Generally, this work falls under the rubric of microeconomic analysis. Indeed, we 
often use models such as those mentioned earlier involving on1y two or three agents and 
several cornmodities. But it is not the fact that we use small models that distinguishes this 
research as a branch of microeconomics; microeconomics comprises a set of tools, whereas 
(contemporary) macroeconomics comprises a set of topics - inflation, unemployment, 
growth. Nor does the fact that the analysis is suitable for small problems (such as children 
sharing toys or finn partners sharing profits) preclude its relevance for large issues (such as 
the distribution of national wealth). The principIe advantage of studying small models of this 
sort is that they often present the problem in its most basic fonn; larger models often add 
little to our understanding and yet come at great analytical cost. A disadvantage of small 
models, however, is that they may actually include factors which are unimportant at the 
aggregate level. For example, with many agents, strategic behavior (the consideration of the 
consequences of one's actions on other agents and vice versa) may be unimportant. (In 
contrast, as mentioned aboye, price-taking behavior may be inappropriate with only a few 
agents.) 
2.2.3. Equity and other objectives 
Finally, I would point out that equity is rarely posed as the sole social objective. 
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Otherwise, one might easily create a "just" society by disposing of a sufficient quantity of 
resources so that aH people might be equaHy impoverished. The more interesting issue, 
therefore, concems the possibility of achieving an equitable state that also satisfies other 
social criteria such as meeting peoples' needs, utilizing resources efficiently, providing 
proper incentives, or encouraging growth. 1 shall focus primarily on efficiency. Thus, in 
formulating a notion of faimess, the fundamental issue will be whether there exist equitable 
and efficient social states. 
3. Ordinal Distributive Justice 
As Amartya Sen (1992) has argued, "the central question in the analysis and 
assessment of equality is ... 'equality of what?'" Le., there are many variables which might 
serve as the focus of our attention. One might define equality in terms of income or 
consumption or rights or achievements or opportunities or .... In the subsequent discussion, 
1 will first distinguish between outcome or end-state notions of faimess versus procedural 
notions. The former ascribe equity as a property of the allocation of resources and the latter 
as a property of the procedure or mechanism by which resources are allocatedY Thus far, 
the study of fair outcomes has received the most attention, and 1 will refer to this as the 
classical domain. 
llThe terms outcome and end-state are slight misnomers since they might equally apply to the initial position 
rather than the final one. However, in that the initial allocation might be the outcome under autarky, 1 will retain 
the nomenclature. 
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3.1. Equitable Outcomes: Two Definitions 
There are currently two main paradigms in the classical tradition, and a number of
 
variants within each. 1 will call the first the no-envy approach and the second the
 
egalitarian-equivalence approach, and 1 will describe them in tumo
 
3.1.1. No-envy 
The first fully ordinal equity criterion was introduced by Foley (1967).12 According 
to this criterion, an allocation is envy-free if no agent prefers the consumption bundle of 
another agentY Formally, let Ui(Xi) denote person i's utility from consuming the bundle 
There are several attractive features of this notion of faimess. First, as mentioned 
previously, it does not require interpersonal utility comparisons. Rather than compare person 
i' s utility to person j's utility, it entails comparing i' s utility from consuming Xi to i' s utility 
from consuming xj . Clearly, it is possible to ask person i which of two consumption bundles 
he or she prefers. AIso, Varian (1974) and Svennson (1983) have shown that envy-free and 
efficient allocations exist in exchange economies under very general conditions. For 
instance, if we were to divide resources equally and allow people to trade at market­
determined prices, then the outcome would be envy-free and efficient. (In fact, this 
12See Baumol (1986), Thomson (199üb), Arnsperger (1994), or Young (1994) for historical notes. 
13A strong form of this criterion was proposed by Tinbergen (1953), but this relies on nonordinally comparable 
information. See also Steinhaus (1948). 
141 use a utility function rather than an ordinal preference relation to describe agents' tastes solely for 
convenience. Here, as in the remainder of the paper, only ordinal properties of the utility function are used. That 
is, Ui(Xi»Ui(X'i) means person i prefers Xi to X,i, and no significance is attributed to the cardinal value of Ui(Xi). 
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describes a procedure for generating an equitable and efficient outcome which itself has 
various appealing properties. 1 will return to this point below.) Indeed, envy-free and 
efficient allocations exist under even weaker conditions than those needed to ensure the 
existence of a competitive/market equilibrium. 
However, there are several problems and paradoxes involving the envy-free criterion 
as well. For example, Kolm (1972) has shown that there may be envy-free allocations that 
allow for mutual welfare improvements (and are thus inefficient), and yet all such 
improvements introduce envy! Indeed, Goldman and Sussangkam (1978) established that this 
phenomenon is entirely general and not limited to a few isolated examples. But the most 
disturbing feature of this notion of fairness was demonstrated by Pazner and Schmeidler 
(1974). They showed that in economies with production, when people have different abilities 
as well as different tastes, envy-free and efficient allocations may not existo 
To address this and other difficulties with the envy-free criterion, numerous 
modifications were introduced in the 1970s and 1980s. These include balanced envy-freedom 
[Daniel (1975)] (everyone should envy and be envied by the same number of agents), per­
capita fairness [Pazner (1977)] (no one should prefer the average bundle in the economy to 
his or her own), average envy-freedom [Thomson (1982)] (no one should prefer the average 
bundle among the other agents), coalitional fairness [Jaskold-Gabszewicz (1975) and Vind 
(1972)] (no group of agents should prefer the aggregate resources of any other group of the 
same size I5), income-fairness [Pazner and Schmeidler (1978aYÓ] (aH agents should have 
15A group of agents prefers one bundle of resources to another if every member of the group can be made 
better-off with the former than with the latter. 
16Although published in 1978, pazner and Schmeidler (l978a) was written in 1974. 
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the same wealth at efficiency prices), and wealth-fairness [Varian (1974)] (no one should 
prefer the consumption-output bundle of another agent, when one compares the amount of 
time he or she would have to work to match the other agent's output). All of these are 
discussed in the surveys mentioned earlierY 
3.1.2. Egalitarian-equivalence 
An altemative notion of faimess representing an entirely different methodological 
approach is that of egalitarian-equivalence introduced by Paznar and Schmeidler (1978b). To 
motivate the definition, note that an obvious focal point in identifying a fair outcome is equal 
division (the egalitarian allocation), in which all agents receive exactly the same quantities of 
all cornmodities. Indeed, in the earlier example of the two children, I did not suggest that 
equal division is unfair but only that it is generally inconsistent with Pareto efficiency. But if 
equal division is fair, then, one might argue, so is any other allocation in which everyone is 
indifferent between their bundle and the egalitarian one. In fact, we need not consider only 
the egalitarian allocation of the existing resources; we might agree that the egalitarian 
allocation of any bundle of resources is fair. Then, in reference to the actual bundle, an 
allocation is egalitarian-equivalent if each person is indifferent between their present 
component and an egalitarian allocation in sorne, possibly fictitious, reference economy. 
Thus, one might argue that the present allocation of welfare or utility could have arisen 
I'Rather than modify the envy-free criterion for use in production economies, an altemative might be to restrict 
the use of this criterion to only those production problems in which envy-free and efficient allocations do existo 
Piketty (1994) has identified sufficient conditions to ensure existence, although his conditions are quite limited. 
Also, Varian (1974) established that if al! agents have either identical tastes or identical productivities, then such 
allocations existo 
15 
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under strict egalitarianism in an appropriately defined reference economy. Formally, a 
feasible allocation x= (Xl, ... ,xn) is egalitarian-equivalent if there exists a bundle x such that 
Ui(Xi) = ui(x) , for all i. Here, x is interpreted as the per capita bundle at the egalitarian 
allocation (x, ... ,x). In spite of the fact that this identifies a fair distribution of welfare, it is 
operationally devoid of interpersonal utility comparisons. 
Pazner and Schmeidler established that egalitarian-equivalent and efficient allocations 
exist under very mild restrictions even in production economies. But there are other, more 
significant, problems with this notion. Most importantly, it is possible for one agent to get 
more of all cornmodities than another agent at an egalitarian-equivalent allocation. In fact, it 
is even possible for one agent to get everything and another nothing. In my opinion, this is 
an unacceptable feature for a notion of faimess. 18 
3.2. Alternative Domains: Procedures, Net Trades, and Opportunities 
Each of the aforementioned notions proposes a definition of a fair outcome. But 
while this has been the focus of most theoretical work on the subject, the public seems 
largely concemed that economic institutions should be fair and that people should have equal 
opportunities. In the United States, for example, there is legislation to protect against 
discrimination in housing, education, and employment. But one does not see legislative 
initiatives to effect equal outcomes. 19 Also, in describing die experimental evidence on 
18The equivalence methodology has also generated several variants including envylree equivalence [pazner 
(1977)], equal-opportunity equivalence [Thomson (1994)], and constant returns equivalence [Mas-Colell (1980)] 
discussed below. 
19Redistributive taxation can be viewed either as a means to affect outcomes or as a means to affect 
opportunities. In any event¡ there are no initiatives to entirely level the distribution of wealth. 
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people's perceptions of fairness, Miller (1992) concludes, "popular opinion gives a central 
place to dessert [Le., cornpensation for effort and achievernent] in thinking about justice." 
In this section I will describe sorne of the work that has been done on procedural 
fairness and on the new analysis of equitable opportunities. 
3.2.1. Procedural fairness 
First, I would distinguish between a fair procedure versus a procedure designed to 
bring about a fair outcorne. For the latter, any procedure that guarantees the correct result is 
satisfactory. Whereas for the former, any outcorne is satisfactory providing it was obtained 
by an acceptable procedure. For exarnple, if one wishes to obtain an envy-free allocation 
arnong two people, then a procedure one rnight use is the divide-and-choose method: let one 
person divide the resources and the other choose their rnost preferred portion. 20 But while 
this will ensure that the outcorne is envy-free, the rnechanisrn is systernatically biased in 
favor of the divider in that both people would prefer that role.21 
And so a fair outcorne can be obtained by a biased or unfair procedure. Conversely, 
a fair procedure rnight generate very unfair outcornes. For exarnple, in the exchange 
context, Schmeidler and Vind (1972) applied the concept of no-envy to net trades, or to 
changes in one's holdings, rather than to consurnption bundles. Thus, if agent i is endowed 
20See Kolm (1972) and Crawford (1977). Also, generalizations of the divide-and-choose method to include 
additional agents were discussed by Steinhaus (1948), Singer (1962), and Kuhn (1967). 
21They can do at least as well, and often better, in the role of divider as in the role of chooser. 
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with the bundle wi and yet consumes Xi, then its net trade is ti = Xi - wi•22 A list of net trades 
is envy-free if no agent prefers the net trade of another agent, or if Ui(Wi+ti) ~Ui(Wi+tj), for 
all pairs i,j. Now, suppose agents trade from the initial allocation at market-determined 
prices. These "competitive trades" would indeed be envy-free. However, if we operate this 
procedure from a grossly inequitable starting point, then, of course, the outcome will be 
inequitable as well because the procedure does not change the distribution of wealth. 
What if we were to operate a fair procedure from a fair initial allocation?23 For 
example, the process I described earlier in which we first divide resources equally and then 
allow people to trade at market-determined prices will necessarily result in an envy-free and 
efficient allocation in an exchange problem. (In fact, I believe this was the intuition behind 
the Czech and Hungarian privatization schemes, although the designers were probably 
unaware of the precise sense in which this is fair.) Such an outcome, called a competitive 
equilibrium from equal division, has several appealing properties the most compelling of 
which is that they are the only envy-free and efficient outcomes in large, diverse 
populations. 24 However, in economies with production, a competitive equilibrium from 
equal endowments need not be envy-free due to differences in the productivities of the 
agents. 
22The lth component of ti is positive if i has acquired additional units of commodity l and consumes more than 
its endowment, and negative if it has reduced its holdings of l and consumes less than its endowment. 
23Thomson (1983) contains a systematic discussion of consistency between equity criteria applied to the initial 
position, the rules of exchange, and the final position. 
HTo be precise, an envy-free and efficient allocation must be a competitive equilibrium from equal division in 
an economy with a continuum of agents among whom tastes vary continuously. See Varian (1976, p.254). 
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An altemative, axiomatic analysis of procedural faimess in production economies is 
contained in Kranich (1994). There, I addressed the following question. In an economy 
with diverse tastes and talents, is it possible to design an allocation procedure with three 
properties: (1) agents are free to work any number of hours they choose, (2) if agents work 
equal numbers of hours, they receive equal rewards regardless of their productivities, and (3) 
the outcome is Pareto efficient? 
To answer this, I considered the simplest formulation of the joint production problem 
in which two people, A and B, each contribute labor to produce a single output, y. The 
technology is given by Y= f(LA,LB), where Li denotes the labor input of person i, and f is 
known by both agents. AIso, person i's preferences are represented by a well-behaved utility 
function of the form ui(Li,yi), which is decreasing in its first argument and increasing in its 
second. 
In this context, a division procedure is a rule 4> which specifies a division of the 
product for each pair of labor inputs, Le., 4>(LA,LB) = (4)A(LA,LB),4>B(LA,LB)) such that 
4>A(LA,LB)+4>B(LA,LB) = f(LA,LB), for all LA,LB. I then imposed the following requirement on 
4> that I called the equal-division-jor-equal-work (EDEW) principle: if LA=LB, then 
4>A(LA, LB) =4>B(LA,LB), that is, if the agents work the same number of hours, they should 
divide the output evenly. 
At first glance, it would seem that by ignoring productivities, a procedure that 
satisfies the EDEW principIe, an EDEW procedure, would faíl to provide the necessary 
incentives to achieve an efficient outcome. However, I showed in the paper that that is often 
not the case; there is a large class of problems in which an EDEW division rule can indeed 
19 
l
 
be used to achieve an efficient allocation. 25 
The extent to which this result can be generalized to inelude additional agents and/or 
cornmodities is an open question. Although even at this stage, it may be applicable to 
problems such as operating a jointly owned enterprise or partnership. 
3.2.2. Opponunities 
The issue of equitable opportunities has been discussed extensively in Social 
Philosophy and Ethics, but relatively Httle within Economics. And, in particular, there has 
been almost no fonnal analysis. Many authors have suggested that agents should have the 
same opportunities. (Cf. Kolm (1973) and Thomson (1994).] Then any differences that 
might emerge would reflect the idiosyncracies of tastes or individual effort. But what if 
opportunities are not identical, how should we compare them? In tenns of our earlier 
distinction, the definition of equitable opportunities might be straightforward, but what is 
required is an ordinal ranking of distributions of opportunities. In other words, given a 
group of n individuals, and given two aHemative lists, or profiles, 0=(01, ... ,on) and 
O'=(O'I, ... ,o'n) specifying the opportunity sets for each ofthe individuals, which is more 
equitable? This is the question I posed in Kranich (1993a). Before discussing this, however, 
25To be precise, 1 assumed the agents take the division rule as given, that is, as an institutional feature beyond 
their control. Then since the reward of each person depends on the labor contribution of the other person, agents 
can behave strategically. That is, each division rule induces a game in which the agents choose their labor supplies 
and the outcome is determined by the rule. 1 consider the Nash equilibria of such games, or the pairs of strategies 
which each represent a best response to the other. And 1 establish sufficient conditions under which there exists 
an EDEW division rule with an efficient Nash equilibrium allocation. The proof, in which 1 construct an 
appropriate <1>, is based on the following observation. Under an EDEW division rule, and given the choice of LB, 
agent A's strategies include the bundles (LA,<I>A(LA,LB)) and (LB,I/2f(LB,LB)). That is, agent A has the option of 
working as much as agent B and dividing the resulting output equally. However, in equilibrium A chooses not to. 
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I would note that a recent paper by Fleurbaey (1995) contains the seeds of a similar 
inquiry.26 
Fleurbaey addresses, somewhat abstractly, the appropriate domain of social 
responsibility. He proposes the following: 
My proposal would be to draw a list of all relevant outcomes which 
depict an individual's fate (health, living standard, educational level, career, 
family life, sense development, preference satisfaction, cheerfulness, etc.) .... 
Then for each of these outcomes ... it must be decided what decision centers 
(government, local authorities, associations, family and friends ... and last but 
not least, the individual herselt) should assume sorne responsibility for the 
achievement obtained by the individuaL... Now, the particular responsibility 
of social institutions would be to achieve equality across individuals, in the 
outcomes for which these institutions are responsible. 
While this contains an explicit call for equality of opportunity (at least in those 
dimensions that are the responsibility of social institutions), by identifying the components of 
"an individual's fate," it implicitly provides a method of comparing profiles: devise a 
measure of distance for all relevant components. How does access to health care vary across 
individuals? Or the standard of living? Etc. Perhaps the distance between components can 
be used as a measure of inequality. 
In contrast, in Kranich (1993a) I directly addressed the issue of ranking profiles of 
opportunity sets. There, the objective was to demonstrate by means of an example that the 
axiomatic approach is tractable in this context, that is, it is possible to specify criteria which 
enable us to rank all profiles of opportunity sets. Generally, such criteria take the form of 
"independence" requirements which specify changes in the components that should not affect 
26Here, 1 am extrapolating beyond the contents of the papero Although the author did not pursue the question 
of ranking altemative profiles, his formulation may be amenable to such an extension. 
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the ranking, and "monotonicity" requirements which specify changes that should affect the 
ranking and how. For example, such a ranking should be anonymous. Thus, in the 2-agent 
case, (01,02) and (02,01) should be judged equally. Altematively, suppose 0 1 is a subset of 
0 2 • Then one might argue that agent 2's opportunites are greater than agent 1's, and any 
further expansion of 0 2 should decrease faimess. Or, intuitively, if the "rich" get richer 
without any change in the circumstances of the "poor," then faimess should decrease. In 
Kranich (1993a), I established that these and similar axioms imply a unique way to rank 
profiles of finite opportunity sets, namely, one profile is more equitable than another if and 
on1y if the difference in size between the opportunity sets in the former is less than that in 
the latter. 
This previous result is nalve for several reasons, but it demonstrates that the 
axiomatic framework is viable, and it suggests that further research in this direction might be 
fruitful. In fact, there have already been several attempts by myself and others to extend the 
analysis by considering altemative axioms [see Kranich (1993b) and Herrero, lturbe-
Ormaetxe, and Nieto (1995)] and by investigating the compatibility of equitable opportunites 
with other social objectives [see Kranich (1995)]. While I am very optimistic about the 
potential usefulness of this work, it is too recent to have generated applications. 
3.3. Sorne Lirnited Application?7 
Next, I will describe sorne limited applications of ordinal theories of justice. 
27In addition to those mentioned here, Baumol (1986) discusses several applications in Industrial Organization 
and Public Finance. See also Young (1994). 
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3.3.1. Division with single-peaked preferences 
To be concrete, I will consider a particular example. A cornmon problem in divorce 
proceedings is that of determining how much time children should spend with each parent. 
The formal structure of this problem is quite simple. It involves allocating a single, divisible 
cornmodity (the childrens' time) between the two parents, each of whom has preferences 
defined over the various allocations. Typically, each parent has a most preferred share and 
is worse-off if they receive either more or less than this amount. Such preferences are called 
"single-peaked." I will describe two possible solution procedures for such a problem. 
First, suppose both parents were asked to state their most preferred allocation. For 
instance, suppose the father suggests that the children spend 1/2 of their time with each 
parent, and the mother suggests that they stay with her 3/4 of the time and with the father for 
1/4. The two procedures I will describe recornmend different solutions. 
First, the Uniform Rule would proceed to allocate the childrens' time equally to both 
parents as long as there is enough available and until one parent has obtained their most 
preferred quantity. At this point, more time would be allocated to the other parent until he 
or she received their most preferred quantity. If there is more time to be allocated, that 
would again be divided equal1y. In the present example, each parent would receive 1/2.28 
The Uniform Rule focuses on how much time each parent wants. Conversely, one 
could focus on the amount of time each parent would give the other. According to the 
Contested Garment Principie, which was described in the Babylonian Talmud, the body of 
280ne test case for an arbitration scheme is that in which the participants fully agree, and an appropriate scheme 
should recornmend this outcome. In the example, for instance, suppose the father would like to have the children 
for lA of the time and the mother would like them for ~. Both the Uniform Rule and the subsequent procedure 
would recornmend this division. 
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Jewish legal commentary fram the first five centuries A. D., the father should get 3/8 and the 
mother 5/8. According to this principie, in announcing their preferred allocations, the father 
conceded 112 to the mother and the mother 114 to the father. Thus, what is at issue is the 
remaining 1/4, and the Contested Gannent PrincipIe recommends that this be divided 
equally. 
Now that we have seen two reasonable procedures for solving this problem, which is 
better? In one respect, at least, the Unifonn Rule behaves better. Consider that this 
problem is somewhat different from those discussed earlíer. Here, although we are not 
comparing directly the father's utility to the mother's, we are comparing their preferred 
divisions, and since this is not verifiable, they could líe. That is, knowing how the 
arbitration is to be resolved, both parents might announce a division other than their most 
preferred in order to influence the outcome in their favor. For example, if the mother knew 
that the decision was to be made by means of the Contested Gannent Principie, then by 
suggesting more than 3/4 for herself, she could be allotted more than 5/8. In this way, the 
Contested Gannent Principie can be manipulated by strategic agents. However, the Unifonn 
Rule does not have this problem: Sprumont (1991) established that under the Unifonn Rule, 
one cannot be better-off by recommending an allocation other than one's true most preferred 
division. We say the procedure is strategy-prooj. Moreover, Sprumont showed that the 
outcome under this procedure will necessarily be envy-free and Pareto efficient and ir is the 
only procedure wirh these three propertiesF9 
Both the Unifonn Rule and the Contested Gannent PrincipIe can be generalízed to 
29Sprumont also established that the Uniform Rule is the only solution to satisfy anonymity (see p.8), strategy­
proofness, and efficiency. For an alternative characterization see Ching (1994). 
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include any number of agents. AIso, they clear1y apply to a larger class of problems than 
our simple example. The salient features of such problems are (i) they involve the allocation 
of a single, infinitely divisible cornmodity between two or more agents, (ii) all agents have 
equal claims to the resources, and (iii) the agents' preferences are single-peaked.30 
In this third feature, the example is somewhat atypical of the traditional economic 
problem in which agents are assumed to want as much of each resource as they can possibly 
obtain. A more traditional problem is the following. 
3.3.2. Cost sharing 
Consider the problem of sharing the general maintenance costs among the co-tenants 
of an apartment building, or that of allocating the construction costs of a shared water facility 
between municipalities. These are examples of cost sharing problems. The general structure 
of such problems involves two or more agents who demand different quantities of a 
homogeneous output, and the central question is how to divide the required inputs, either 
financial or real. 
In the simplest formulation of the cost sharing problem, the output demands are 
given, and thus the aggregate cost is fixed. A more complete analysis would determine the 
output demands as well. In practice, a variety of algorithms for allocating costs have been 
employed, sorne of which are discussed in Moulin (1987). Here, I will discuss a procedure 
introduced by Shenker (1990) called Serial Cost Sharing. Rather than describe the general 
procedure, I will again consider a numerical example. 
3D Feature (ii) is not essential. In fact, Klaus, Peters and Storcken (1994) recently extended the Uniform Rule 
to problems with possibly different initial claims. 
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As suggested aboye, suppose three towns are to install a joint water supply network. 
Suppose further that the cost of producing a network of size Q is given by the function 
C(Q)=Q2. The towns demand ~=1O, Cffi=20, and qc=30, respectively. Thus, the total 
quantity to be produced is 60. The Serial Cost Sharing formula would allocate the total 
production cost of 3600 such that town A pays 300, town B pays 1100, and town C pays 
2200. The reasoning is as follows. Since each of the towns demands at least 10, the first 30 
units are "demanded equally." Hence, the production costs (900) should be shared equally. 
The next 20 units, however, are demanded only by towns B and C. Therefore the 
incremental cost (2500-900) should be shared equally among B and C only. The final 10 
units are demanded only by C and thus it should incur the full incremental cost 
(3600 - 2500). 
The Serial Cost Sharing formula is more complicated than others such as allocating 
costs equally (in terms of the example: 1200,1200,1200) or in proportion to demand 
(600,1200,1800). Why then should we be interested in this mechanism? The answer is that 
it has at least two attractive features. First, like the Uniform Rule for problems with single­
peaked preferences, it is strategy-proof; if the agents know that costs will be allocated by 
means of the Serial Cost Sharing formula, then they can do no better than to announce their 
true demands. Hence, this procedure direct1y determines the output demands in that it 
provides the incentives for correct revelation. Also, the outcome under Serial Cost Sharing 
will be envy-free, that is, no agent will prefer the input/output combination assigned to any 
other agent. Unfortunately, however, for the c1ass of problems in question, Serial Cost 
Sharing is not necessarily Pareto efficient. In fact, Moulin (1990a) has shown that for this 
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class of problems, there is no solution procedure that generates envy-free and Pareto efficient 
outcomes and, in addition, satisfies the fol1owing condition known as the stand alone 
property. Notice that in the previous example, the technology for producing Q exhibits 
decreasing retums to scale. This means that as the quantity produced increases so do the 
unit costs of production. Thus, when the municipalities cooperate to build a larger facility, 
they drive up the unit production costs for each of them relative to the unit costs if each were 
to produce their own facility using the same technology. 31 Hence, they impose an 
extemality, of sorts, on each other. The stand alone property requires that none of the three 
should gain as a result of this extemality, or that they should al1 contribute to the loss. 
The fact that no mechanism is envy-free, efficient, and satisfies the stand alone 
property identifies another necessary tradeoff in our reasoning about social objectives. 
3.3.3. Common ownership and privatization 
The reciprocal problem of cost al1ocation is surplus division. For example, consider 
the case in which two or more individuals own a productive enterprise in cornmon. If the 
enterprise is ongoing, there is the question of how to divide the periodic profits or losses. 
Or if the enterprise is to be dissolved, they must distribute the joint assets. The former is 
complicated by the fact that partners need not contribute equal1y. And the latter is 
particularly relevant in today's climate of privatization of col1ective enterprises. 
In fact, we have seen one formulation of this problem already in the discussion of the 
31This does not mean that they should necessarily build three separate facilities. First, there is the question of 
whether, individuaIly, they have access to the technology for producing Q. AIso, here we are considering the cost 
of producing the water supply network rather than the cost of operating it. The latter may exhibit economies of 
scaIe. 
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EDEW principIe, where a single output was produced from heterogeneous labor. There, the 
technology might be considered the cornmon property of the two agents, and they are jointly 
entitled to its product. To be precise, it concems the cornmon ownership of one productive 
resource (the technology itself) and the private ownership of another (the labor inputs). This 
issue has been the subject of several recent investigations by Moulin, Roemer and 
SilvestreY [See Silvestre (1994) for a survey.] Their approach has been axiomatic as 
well. For example, as an expression of public ownership of the means of production, one 
might insist that all agents should gain from an improvement in the technology. Or, if labor 
is privately owned, one might require that no agent should be worse-off as a result of an 
increase in his or her productivity, ceteris paribus. Using such axioms in conjunction with 
Pareto efficiency, Roemer and Silvestre (1989, 1993) and Moulin (199üb) characterized three 
solution concepts: the equal benefits solution, which assigns equal profit shares of a joint 
technology; the proportional solution, which assigns profit shares proportional to the value of 
labor inputs; and the constant returns equivalent solution [Mas-Colell (1980)], in which the 
current utility allocation could have been generated by sorne, possibly fictitious, constant 
retums to scale technology. 33 
How do these solutions to the mixed ownership problem compare to the analysis of 
the equal-division-for-equal-work principIe? Obviously, one difference concems the axioms. 
But a further difference concems the disposition of labor. The EDEW analysis explicitly 
32Moulin (l990a, 1990b), Roemer (1986), and Roemer and Silvestre (1989, 1993). 
33Also, Moulin and Roemer (1989) characterized the welfare egalitarian mechanism, which associates with each 
economy those allocations at which normalized utilities are equal across agems, as an expression of "public 
ownership of the external world and private ownership of self." But this obviously requires interpersonally 
comparable utilities. 
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addressed the strategic/incentive effects of the labor supply decision, whereas the analyses of 
the other solutions have not. That is, they do not analyze the optimal behavior of the agents 
when they are aware of the fact that their labor supply decisions will affect their share of the 
profits. 34 
3.3.4. Potential applications oIopportunity rankings 
Since formal analysis of opportunity fairness is just beginning, there have been no 
applications of these techniques as of yet. So, rather than review past accomplishments, 1 
will cornment briefly on the potential of this approach. 
There are at least two motivations for advocating equitable opportunities rather than 
equitable outcomes or procedures: first, to allow for individual differences in the desire or 
motivation to exploit one's opportunities; and, second, to distinguish between those 
differences that are the responsibility of the individual and those that are not, and to remedy 
the latter. Several of the most controversial issues in the United States today concern this 
distinction between personal and societal responsibility. Two obvious examples are 
affirmative action, the preferential treatment of minorities and women, and public funding of 
private and religious education. 
Regarding affirmative action, the fundamental questions are: When should society 
remediate for past injustices? And when is remediation no ionger necessary? Currently, 
there is a great deal of controversy over the merits of such programs. There are those who 
believe that equity has been achieved (or is not worth achieving). And there are those who 
34Moreover, attempting to incorporate such considerations could be problematic in that the induced game of 
labor choice may have no (pure strategy) Nash equilibria without additional restrictions. 
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believe that the legacy of racism is still pervasive. In my opinion, this controversy stems 
from the fact that there are no adequate tools for assessing what, if any, progress has been 
made. To evaluate the success of affinnative action programs requires that we can rank 
profiles in the manner described aboye. An even more difficult question concems the extent 
of progress, but this would require a cardinal measure of opportunity faimess. 
Conceming the issue of public funding of private education, there are those who feel 
that this would introduce competition between public and private schools which would 
improve the quality of the public school system. But 1 believe the issue is more basic and 
concems the taxes versus benefits of those who wish to send their children to private schools. 
Currently, such individuals are required to pay taxes to support the public school system, and 
yet they receive no direct benefits. Indeed, they must pay an additional amount for similar 
benefits provided privately. The simplest case that can be made in support of the current 
system is that this transfer/subsidy is warranted on the grounds that it improves the 
distribution of opportunities. However, to properly evaluate the efficacy of this claim would 
again require that we can compare such distributions. 
Similar issues arise in the context of housing, employment, and health care ­
whether to assess the effects of discrimination or to evaluate the need for remediation, it is 
necessary to compare distributions of opportunities. 
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4. Conclusion and an Agenda for the Future 
In this paper, I have atternpted to convey sorne of the flavor of the present state of 
theoretical research on faimess. In particular, I have concentrated on ordinal theories and 
their potential applications. However, in providing a selective review, I naturally overlooked 
rnany factors (such as equity in econornies with indivisible cornmodities35 or with public 
goodS36), and I touched on others only in passing (such as incentives and irnplernentation). 
In conclusion, I would like to highlight sorne of the issues raised and to offer sorne 
suggestions for future research. 
First, let me reiterate that formulating an appropriate definition of faimess is only the 
first and sirnplest analytic objective. For the vast rnajority of applications, sirnply dividing 
solutions into those that are fair and those that are not is insufficient. It is often necessary to 
select arnong unfair altematives. And to do so requires either an ordinal ranking or a 
cardinal rneasure of faimess. Thus, even within the classical dornain of outcorne faimess, 
there is rnuch work to be done. 
Next, I would ernphasize the role of incentives and strategic behavior in the design of 
fair allocation rnechanisrns. A cornmon concem, particularly in the context of production, is 
that greater equality will undermine incentives. For exarnple, in their survey of beliefs about 
inequality, Kluegel and Srnith (1986) report that 85 % of their respondents agree with the 
proposition that "giving everybody about the sarne incorne regardless of the type of work 
35For recent examples, see Alkan, Demange, and Gale (1991) and Aragones (1992) and the references cited 
therein. 
36See Diamantaras (1992). 
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they do would destroy the desire to work hard and do a better job." 
Sorne of the concepts I discussed aboye incorporate strategic considerations and sorne 
do noto For instance, the analysis of EDEW division procedures explicit1y addressed the 
strategic effects of the labor supply decision. Also, the Unifonn Rule and the Serial Cost 
Sharing rnechanisrn are both strategy-proof, and, in this sense, they are robust to 
rnanipulative behavior. But other sharing fonnulas are not irnmune to incentive effects. For 
exarnple, in the surplus sharing problern, proportional division (which Aristotle took to be 
the very definition of fairness) is subject to strategic rnanipulation, Le., if agents know that 
output will be divided in proportion to their individual contributions, then this will distort 
their contributionso In fact, for sorne of the notions I rnentioned, the strategic properties 
have yet to be investigated. Overall, the literature contains very few exarnples of fair 
procedures and rnost of those do not consider incentives. 
Another area that requires further investigation is that of designing simple, practical 
procedures for attaining fair outcornes. The divide-and-choose rnethod, the Unifonn Rule, 
and Serial Cost Sharing each result in an envy.,.free allocationo AIso, Crawford (1979) and 
Dernange (1984) have proposed variations of divide-and-choose that result in egalitarian­
equivalent and efficient outcornes.37 Sirnilarly, one rnight devise other procedures that are 
capable of achieving other notions of fairnesso In light of the present consensus that different 
37The general question of whether or not there exists a procedure that will "implement" a specific solution 
concept is the subject of a rather abstract literature in applied game theory. [See Maskin (1985) for a survey of the 
theory of Nash implementation and Thomson and Varian (1985, SecoS) for a general discussion of the problem of 
implementing equitable allocationso] Suffice it to say that the general procedures advanced in this literature are 
complex and quite synthetic. Such procedures are designed to achieve an arbitrary social objective; in effect, they 
are shells that can be applied with great generalityo This expIains the Iack of specificityo A recent attempt to 
construct simple procedures to solve the general problem based on the "divide-and-permute" principIe is contained 
in Thomson (1993). 
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notions may be suitable in different contexts, such altemative procedures are necessary. 
The final agenda item I would mention is the issue of opportunites. The work that 
has been done in this area so far is very preliminary, but the direction seems promising, both 
for theoretical research as well as for eventual applications. Ironically, this area, which 
represents the greatest concem to those outside the profession, has received the least attention 
within. 
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